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NATIVE AMERICANS – SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
DETERMINING WHETHER THE INDIAN GAMING
REGULATORY ACT ABROGATES TRIBAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR LAWSUITS ARISING OUTSIDE OF INDIAN
COUNTRY
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014)
ABSTRACT
In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) did
not implicitly or explicitly abrogate the common law doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity so as to allow a state to file a federal suit against an
Indian tribe for illegal gambling activity taking place outside of Indian
country. The Court reasoned that neither the text nor the legislative history
of IGRA indicated a desire on the part of Congress to abrogate tribal
immunity to allow for such suits; the fact that IGRA specifically addresses
activities occurring inside of Indian country was dispositive to the Court
that Congress chose to leave traditional state-law remedies in place when
illegal gaming activity occurs outside of Indian country. The Court was
also unwilling to overrule its previous decision of Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., which expanded the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to cover suits arising from contracting
disputes with non-Indian businesses off-reservation. The Court’s holding in
Bay Mills clarifies the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity within the
controversial context of Indian gaming. However, this will not result in any
expansion of Indian gaming beyond Indian country. On the contrary, the
Court’s decision makes clear that states will continue to have a number of
remedies available to them to prevent Indian gaming off-reservation, just
not the sort of federal suit at issue in this case.
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FACTS

The Bay Mills Indian Community (“Bay Mills”) is a federally
recognized Indian tribe located in Northern Michigan.1 In 1993, it entered
into a gaming compact with the State of Michigan (“Michigan”) to open up
a Class III gaming facility on its reservation,2 which would include
casino-style gambling, such as electronic gaming terminals and table
games.3 A provision of the compact expressly stated that neither Michigan
nor Bay Mills had waived their sovereign immunity from suit,4 as the
1. Brief for Respondent at 9, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014)
(No. 12-515) (“The Bay Mills Indian Community has lived in what is now the State of Michigan
for centuries. Continuously acknowledged since the earliest European contacts with the area, Bay
Mills has been federally recognized in its current form since 1936. The tribe has approximately
2,000 registered members, the majority of whom reside on or near the Bay Mills Reservation in
Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.”).
2. Id. at 11-13.
3. Id. at 12.
4. Id.
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compact set out its own dispute resolution procedures to govern any
disagreements.5 Pursuant to the compact, Bay Mills drafted its own gaming
ordinance, which the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”)
subsequently approved.6 The Bay Mills Gaming Commission (“Gaming
Commission”) was established thereafter to administer the Tribe’s gaming
ordinance according to the terms of the compact.7
In 2010, Bay Mills purchased property in the town of Vanderbilt,
Michigan with proceeds it had earned from a land settlement with the
federal government.8 Bay Mills sought to open another Class III gaming
facility on the Vanderbilt property (“the Vanderbilt Casino”). The Gaming
Commission issued a license to authorize the opening of the Vanderbilt
Casino. Michigan subsequently sued Bay Mills in federal district court
under IGRA,9 seeking a preliminary injunction against the opening of the
Vanderbilt Casino.10 It claimed that the opening of the Vanderbilt Casino
violated the terms of the Tribal-State gaming compact and thus constituted
illegal gambling activity under IGRA.11 In its defense, Bay Mills cited the
language of the MILCSA12 and claimed that since the Vanderbilt property
had been purchased with monies from its Land Trust, it ought to be
considered “Indian lands” per the language of IGRA.13 However, the
Department of the Interior issued a memorandum declaring that the

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Bay Mills was part of the Michigan Land Claims Settlement Act of 1997
(“MLCSA”), 111 Stat. 2652, which consolidated the land claims of several federally recognized
tribes including the Sault St. Marie Chippewa Tribe and the Little Traverse Bay Tribe. 111 Stat.
2658. The MLCSA provided that a certain percentage of Bay Mills’ settlement was to be paid
into a “Land Trust,” the proceeds of which would be used to purchase and improve property for
the Tribe. Id. The text of the MLCSA stated that “[a]ny land acquired with funds from the Land
Trust shall be held as Indian lands are held.” Id. Bay Mills purchased the Vanderbilt property
with interest generated from the Land Trust. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 12.
9. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2029 (2014). Michigan sued Bay
Mills pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which reads in relevant part: “The United States
district courts shall have jurisdiction over—(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian
tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any
Tribal-State compact entered into . . . that is in effect . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2006).
10. Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2029.
11. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014) (No. 12-515) (“On
December 16, 2010, Michigan’s Attorney General sent a letter to Bay Mills ordering it to
immediately close the Vanderbilt casino because it violated state and federal gaming laws. Bay
Mills refused, so the State filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin any further operation of the
casino.”).
12. See discussion supra note 8.
13. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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Vanderbilt property could not be considered Indian country.14 As a result,
the district court granted Michigan’s motion for a preliminary injunction.15
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered the injunction be
dissolved, holding that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity barred
Michigan’s suit.16 Michigan appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the IGRA abrogated tribal sovereign
immunity to the extent that Michigan was alleging.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Within the framework of American constitutional law, Native
American tribes occupy a unique position.17 They are considered to be
“domestic dependent nations,”18 political units that retain their inherent
sovereignty but are nonetheless subject to certain limitations on the exercise
of such sovereignty. The exact boundaries of tribal sovereignty have
expanded and contracted throughout history as a result of complex,
overlapping factors, including treaties, federal legislation, executive orders,
and judicial interpretations thereof.19 It is foundational principle of federal
Indian law that Native American tribes are subject to the plenary power of
Congress.20 This essentially means that Congress has the final word as to
the scope of tribal sovereignty and the powers that Tribes are able to
exercise.21 One exception to this general rule is the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity. Tribal sovereign immunity is part of federal common

14. Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent, joint app. at 83, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2029 (2014) (No. 12-515) (“Even if the Tribe had used its Land Trust
earnings to purchase land in an area that could be said to consolidate and enhance tribal
landholdings, I do not believe that the MILCSA would operate as a matter of law to transform that
land purchase into Indian lands under IGRA.”) (emphasis in original).
15. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The district
court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop gaming (a euphemism often
unavoidable for our purposes here) at the Vanderbilt casino.”).
16. Id. at 416-17.
17. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831) (“The condition of the Indians, in
relation to the United States, is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.”).
18. Id. at 17.
19. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians § 7 (2014).
20. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently
described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”).
21. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes . . . incorporation
within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested
them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previously exercised. By specific treaty
provision they yielded up other sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of its plenary control,
Congress has removed still others.”) (citation omitted).
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law; it was not created by any statute or act of Congress.22 Rather, the
Supreme Court first identified it, and its exact boundaries have been further
defined through a substantial body of federal case law.23
A. THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court first acknowledged tribal sovereign immunity in
Turner v. United States,24 in which a non-Indian lessee was barred from
suing an Indian tribe for alleged damage done to his property.25 The Court
stated that it is the “general law” that “[l]ike other governments, municipal
as well as state, [tribes are] free from liability for injuries to persons or
property . . . .”26 In United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,27 the Supreme Court reiterated that Indian tribes are immune from suit
when it voided a monetary judgment from a previous proceeding against the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.28 It stated that tribes do not waive their

22. See Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, 50 THE ADVOC. 19, 19 (2007).
23. Id.
24. 28 U.S. 354 (1919).
25. Id. at 357. The dispute in Turner concerned the efforts of a non-Indian rancher (Turner)
to secure grazing land from members of the Creek Nation (now more commonly known as the
Muscogee Nation). Id. at 355. Turner leased approximately 256,000 acres from approximately
one hundred Creek Indians. Id. at 355-56. Turner secured, by judicial order, the right to build a
fence around the leased land and undertook construction of such a fence. Id. However, a mob of
Creek Indians destroyed the fence, causing damage to the tune of $10,000. Id. Turner sued the
Creek Nation and the federal government in its trustee capacity. Id. at 357. In an opinion
authored by Justice Brandeis, the Court held that “[w]ithout authorization from Congress, the
[Creek] Nation could not then have been sued in any court; at least without its consent.” Id. at
358.
26. Id. at 357-58.
27. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
28. Id. at 513. United States Fidelity involved a complex dispute over coal leasing royalties.
The federal government leased land held in trust for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations (“the
Tribes”) to a coal mining company, with a bond in place securing royalty payments for the Tribes.
Id. at 510. The United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (“US Fidelity”) served as a surety to the
royalty bond. Id. The coal lease would be assigned several times, with US Fidelity remaining as
the surety on record. Id. Ultimately, the lease was assigned to the Central Coal & Coke Company
(“Central Coal”), which eventually went into receivership. Id. As part of Central Coal’s
bankruptcy proceedings, the United States filed a claim on behalf of the Tribes for unpaid
royalties. Id. In a separate action, the United States filed a claim against US Fidelity for the same
royalties at issue in the Central Coal dispute. Id. Central Coal cross-claimed for credits
apparently owed to it by the Tribe. Id. The federal district court administering the bankruptcy
awarded a judgment against the Tribes in favor of Central Coal. Id. This judgment occurred
while the dispute against US Fidelity was still ongoing. Id. In light of the judgment against the
Tribes, US Fidelity claimed that the United States was estopped from asserting its claims under
the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 511. The Supreme Court held that Central Coal’s cross-claim
should have been barred by the Tribes’ immunity from suit; thus, the monetary judgment against
the Tribes was void and the United States’ suit against US Fidelity was allowed to proceed. Id. at
512.
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sovereign immunity when they fail to object to cross-claims in litigation.29
In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of State of Washington,30 the
Court held that a state could not sue a tribe to enforce its fishing regulations
in Indian country “[a]bsent an effective waiver or consent” from either the
Tribe or the United States.31 However, the Court refused to extend this
immunity to individual officials or representatives of the Tribe.32
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,33 the Court expanded Puyallup’s
holding by stating that any waiver of tribal immunity “‘must be
unequivocally expressed.’”34 In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,35 the Court rejected a contention that was
nearly identical to the one it had addressed in United States Fidelity over a
half-century prior, further solidifying the status of tribal immunity as black
letter law.36 In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc.,37 the Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that Native American
tribes were immune from suit for activities engaged in outside of Indian
country. Specifically, the Court declared: “Tribes enjoy immunity from
suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or
commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a

29. Id. at 512-13 (“These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional
authorization. It is as though the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed to the United
States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did. Possessing this immunity from direct suit, we
are of the opinion it possesses a similar immunity from cross-suits.”).
30. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
31. Id. at 172.
32. Id. at 173 (“[T]he successful assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in this case does not
impair the authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual defendants over
whom it properly obtained personal jurisdiction.”).
33. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Santa Clara Pueblo concerned the applicability of the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA). Even though ICRA was meant to provide substantive individual rights to
Indians within Indian country (where the Constitution is largely inapplicable), the Supreme Court
nonetheless held that tribes were immune from suit under the ICRA, even when sued by their own
members. Id. at 58.
34. Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
35. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
36. Id. at 509. Potawatomi concerned the untaxed sale of cigarettes in Indian country to
non-Indians and non-member Indians. The Potawatomi Tribe sold cigarettes without state tax
stamps not only to members of the Tribe (which was perfectly legal), but also to non-Indians. Id.
at 507. Oklahoma claimed it had the right to tax any sales made to non-Indians, including those
that took place on the Potawatomi’s reservation. Id. The Tribe sued Oklahoma for injunctive
relief, and Oklahoma cross-claimed for the alleged outstanding cigarette taxes. Id. at 507-08.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Potawatomi because the United States Fidelity decision
was issued prior to the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 509-10. However,
the Court held that even though counter-claims are “mandatory” under Rule 13(a), Oklahoma’s
claim against the Tribe was nonetheless barred. Id. at 510.
37. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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reservation.”38 The Court did express some hesitation in reaching this
decision, stating that “[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of
perpetuating the doctrine [of tribal immunity].”39 “[T]ribal immunity
extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance,” the
Court stated, and this “consideration[] might suggest a need to abrogate
tribal immunity . . . .”40 However, because Congress had not specifically
abrogated tribal immunity in the context of the case, the Court “decline[d]
to revisit [its] case law and [chose] to defer to Congress.”41
B. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT
Congress developed IGRA to remedy a regulatory gap in Indian
country.42 The Supreme Court has often been the forum by which these
regulatory gaps in Indian country have been identified. Take, for example,
the seminal federal Indian law case of Ex Parte Crow Dog.43 In 1883, the
Supreme Court declared that the federal government had no criminal
jurisdiction over crimes that occurred between Indians in Indian country.44
Two years later, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act,45 which
empowered the federal government to assert exactly the sort of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country that Ex Parte Crow Dog denied.46 Similarly,
in the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia,47 the Supreme Court held
that the states could not have criminal or regulatory authority inside Indian
country.48 That is, until Congress passed Public Law 280 in 1953, which
automatically granted six states unlimited criminal jurisdiction inside Indian
38. Id. at 760.
39. Id. at 758.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 760.
42. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3) (1988) (“The Congress finds that . . . existing Federal law does not
provide clear standards or regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands . . . .”).
43. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
44. Id. at 572 (“the first district court of Dakota was without jurisdiction to find or try the
indictment against the prisoner; that the conviction and sentence are void, and that his
imprisonment is illegal.”).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1885).
46. The Major Crimes Act, in its original form, granted the federal government jurisdiction
over “seven major crimes” if they were committed by an Indian, against another Indian, and the
locus of the crime was within Indian country. These crimes were murder, manslaughter, burglary,
rape, larceny, arson, and assault with intent to commit murder. Since 1885, the Major Crimes Act
has been amended a number of times to add new crimes over which the federal government will
have jurisdiction, including incest, kidnapping, and sexual assault of a minor. Id.
47. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
48. Id. at 520 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force . . . .”).
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country and gave remaining states the option to assume criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country if they so wished.49
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided the case of California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians,50 which concerned both the lawfulness of
gambling within Indian country and Public Law 280. The Cabazon Band
owned a bingo hall and a card club on its reservation in Northern
California.51 Non-Indians from surrounding communities were the primary
customers of the bingo hall and card club.52 California was (and continues
to be) a Public Law 280 state, and California attempted to enforce its
gaming regulations over the Band’s bingo hall under color of its criminal
jurisdiction, which would have forced the hall to become a charitable,
non-profit operation.53 Riverside County also attempted to enforce its
gaming regulations on the Band’s reservation, which would have resulted in
the closure of the card club.54 The Band sued both California and Riverside
County in federal district court, claiming that neither entity had any
authority to enforce their gaming laws inside Indian country.55 The district
court granted the Band’s motion for summary judgment, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.56
At the Supreme Court, California argued that Public Law 280
abrogated tribal sovereignty to the extent that it was entitled to enforce its
gaming regulations over the Band.57 The Court disagreed. It held that in
the absence of any clear authorization from either Congress or the Tribes,
states and municipalities could not impose and enforce their own laws in
Indian country.58 Public Law 280, the Court reasoned, was passed by
Congress to remedy the problem of lawlessness in Indian country.59 The
gaming regulations at issue were not criminal or prohibitive in nature, but
rather were civil and regulatory. Therefore, California had no basis to
assert juris diction.60

49. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1953). The six mandatory states are Alaska, Nebraska, California,
Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id.
50. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
51. Id. at 204-05.
52. Id. at 205.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 205-06.
55. Id. at 206.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 207.
58. Id. at 221-22.
59. Id. at 208.
60. Id. at 212.
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In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress passed IGRA in 1988.61
IGRA provides a complex and detailed framework for the regulation of
gambling and gaming activities within Indian country. It led to the
establishment of the National Indian Gaming Committee (“NIGC”), the
agency mandated by the IGRA to administer its provisions.62 The IGRA
divided gaming activities into three different classes. “Class I gaming” is
defined as “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional
forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in
connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.”63 Class I gaming is
subject only to the regulatory authority of the Tribe and does not fall within
the tenets of the IGRA.64 “Class II gaming” includes bingo and other
games similar to bingo, such as pull-tabs.65 Class II gaming also includes
card games not prohibited by state law.66 Tribes generally retain exclusive
regulatory power over Class II gaming activities, subject to certain
qualifications.67 First, the gaming activity in question must be approved by
the NIGC.68 Second, if a card game is not prohibited by state law, but is
nonetheless regulated, the Tribe must conform to the applicable state
regulations if it wishes to offer such a card game.69
“Class III gaming” includes all other forms of gaming not covered by
Class I or II.70 This includes most forms of casino-style gaming, including:
(a) multiplayer table and card games, such as roulette, blackjack, poker, and
craps; (b) video lottery terminals and slot machines; and (c) virtual betting
or wagering on real-time events, such as sports.71 Unsurprisingly, Class III
gaming is the most heavily regulated under IGRA. In order for a Tribe to
61. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2014).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2014).
63. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2014).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2014).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(I)-(III) (2014).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I)-(II). Note that if a particular game is prohibited under
state law, a Tribe cannot offer such a game within its territory. Similarly, if a state prohibits
gambling altogether, a Tribe is completely barred from offering either Class II or Class III gaming
activities. For example, Utah has a blanket prohibition on gambling, so tribes like the Utah
Navajo Nation cannot enjoy the benefits of gaming or the protections of the IGRA. See Randy
Harward, Navajo Bingo No-Go, SALT LAKE CITY WEEKLY, April 14, 2010,
http://www.cityweekly net/utah/navajo-bingo-no-go/Content?oid=2144973.
67. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2014).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(B) (2014).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(4)(A) (2014).
70. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2014).
71. Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Jurisdictional Issues Arising Under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act 197 A.L.R. FED. 459 (2004) (“Class III gaming is defined as all forms of
gaming that are not Class I gaming or Class II gaming including slot machines, casino games,
banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries . . . .”).
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engage in Class III gaming on its lands, a tribe must satisfy several statutory
prerequisites. First, the particular form of gaming sought by the Tribe
cannot be prohibited under state law.72 Second, the Tribe must negotiate a
compact with the State, and the Secretary of the Interior must approve this
compact.73 Third, the Tribe must have in place a Tribal gaming ordinance
that has been approved by the NIGC.74
In 1996, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a section
of IGRA in the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.75 In that case,
the Seminole Tribe sued Florida under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)76 of IGRA
for failure to negotiate a gaming compact with the Tribe in good faith.77
Florida claimed that section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) was unconstitutional because
it purported to waive the sovereign immunity of the States without their
explicit consent.78 The Court agreed with Florida, holding that regardless
of the fact that the Indian Commerce Clause79 authorized Congress to pass
the IGRA, “notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent to abrogate the States’
sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress
that power . . . .”80 Therefore, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits
Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being sued in federal
court.”81 As a result of this decision, very little bargaining power remained
with tribes, which negatively affected the tribes’ ability to negotiate
favorable gaming compacts.82
72. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A) (2014).
73. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2014).
74. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2014).
75. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
76. This section of the IGRA reads:
[t]he United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over . . . any cause of action
initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations
with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact . . . or to
conduct such negotiations in good faith . . . .
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (2014).
77. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 52.
78. Id.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
80. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 47.
81. Id. at 76.
82. See Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Negotiating Meaningful Concessions from States in Gaming
Compacts to Further Tribal Economic Development: Satisfying the “Economic Benefits” Test, 54
S.D. L. REV. 419, 432 (2009) (“The Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe left IGRA at the very least
crippled, but at the most, completely broken (at least from the tribal prospective). Tribes were left
with virtually no negotiating power. After Seminole Tribe, it was approximately two years before
another class III gaming compact was finalized. States simply refuse to negotiate if they do not
want a tribe to conduct class III gaming without sharing revenue or for any other reason.”)
(explanatory parenthetical appearing in original).
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III. ANALYSIS
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the majority.83 It held that
IGRA did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity to allow for federal suits
when the locus of the alleged illegal gaming activity is not in Indian
country.84 First, the Court interpreted several provisions of IGRA before
ultimately concluding that the plain language of the statute only enables
states to sue tribes in federal court when the locus of the illegal “gaming
activity” is “on Indian lands,” that is, when the actual gambling is taking
place within Indian country.85 The Court refused to rewrite IGRA to create
Michigan’s desired remedy, particularly in light of the numerous remedies
states can exercise over Indian commercial activities on state lands.86 Next,
the Court addressed Michigan’s request to overrule Kiowa. The Court held
that both stare decisis and respect for the plenary powers of Congress
required it to uphold Kiowa.87 It reasoned that Congress has had numerous
opportunities since Kiowa to abrogate tribal immunity in the manner that
Michigan sought, but refused to disturb the Court’s holding in that case.88
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court began its opinion with a recitation of settled law concerning
tribal sovereign immunity. It stated that “[a]mong the core aspects of
sovereignty that tribes possess . . . is the ‘common-law immunity from suit

83. Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Sotomayor, and Chief Justice
Roberts. Justice Kagan showed a flair for analogies in her opinion, with a number of droll
references to the underlying subject matter of the dispute, at one point stating that one of
Michigan’s arguments had “come up snake eyes . . . .” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134
S.Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014). On another occasion, Justice Kagan mused that Michigan “need[s] an
ace up its sleeve . . . .” Id. at 2036.
84. Id. at 2039 (“The abrogation of immunity in IGRA applies to gaming on, but not off,
Indian lands . . . . Accordingly, Michigan may not sue Bay Mills to enjoin the Vanderbilt casino,
but must instead use available alternative means to accomplish that object.”).
85. Id. at 2032 (“A State’s suit to enjoin gaming activity on Indian lands . . . falls within §
2710(d)(7)(A)(ii); a similar suit to stop gaming activity off Indian lands does not. And that creates
a fundamental problem for Michigan. After all, the very premise of this suit—the reason
Michigan thinks Bay Mills is acting unlawfully—is that the Vanderbilt casino is outside Indian
lands.”) (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 2035 (“[T]he panoply of tools Michigan can use to enforce its law on its own
lands—no less than the suit it could bring on Indian lands under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)—can shutter,
quickly and permanently, an illegal casino.”).
87. Id. at 2027-28 (“Congress has since reflected on Kiowa and decided to retain tribal
immunity in a case like this. Having held that the issue is up to Congress, the Court cannot
reverse itself now simply because some may think Congress’s conclusion wrong.”).
88. Id. at 2038 (“Since [Kiowa], Congress has continued to exercise its plenary authority
over tribal immunity, specifically preserving immunity in some contexts and abrogating it in
others, but never adopting the change Michigan wants.”).
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traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.’”89 This principle, the Court
stated, is modified “only by placing a tribe’s immunity, like its other
governmental power and attributes, in Congress’s hands.”90 Thus, “we
have time and again treated the ‘doctrine of tribal immunity [as] settled law’
and dismissed any suit against a tribe absent congressional authorization (or
a waiver).”91
1.

Interpreting the Text of IGRA

With this baseline established, the Court then interpreted the text of 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which authorized states to sue tribes for illegal
gambling activity taking place “on Indian lands.”92 Because the basis of
Michigan’s complaint was that the Vanderbilt Casino was operating off of
Indian lands, the Court saw no need to interpret the meaning of “on Indian
lands.”93 However, Michigan “attempt[ed] to fit [its] suit within §
2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) by relocating the ‘class III gaming activity’ to which it is
objecting.”94 Michigan interpreted “class III gaming activity” to mean the
“necessary administrative action” of authorizing and licensing the
Vanderbilt Casino, which was done by the Gaming Commission from
within Bay Mills’ reservation.95 However, the Court disagreed with this
interpretation, holding that “class III gaming activity” could only be “what
goes on in a casino—each roll of the dice and spin of the wheel.”96
Therefore, the Court’s textual interpretation of IGRA foreclosed Michigan’s
ability to sustain its federal suit against Bay Mills.
Michigan next argued that it did not make sense for IGRA to provide a
remedy for illegal gambling that occurs inside Indian country, yet provide
none for illegal gambling that occurs outside of Indian country.97 The

89. Id. at 2030 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2030-31 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756
(1998)) (brackets and parenthetical contained in original).
92. See 25 U.S.C. §2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2014).
93. Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2032.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court also stated that the IGRA would “lose all meaning if . . . ‘class III gaming
activity’ refer[red] equally to the off-site licensing or operation of the games.” Id.
97. Id. at 2033 (“‘[W]hy,’ Michigan queries, ‘would Congress authorize a state to obtain a
federal injunction against illegal tribal gaming on Indian lands, but not on lands subject to the
state’s own sovereign jurisdiction?’ Reply Brief 1.”) (citation contained in original).
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Court acknowledged this apparent contradiction,98 but stated that it was not
the job of the courts to rewrite Congress’s legislation.99 At this point, the
Court made clear that Michigan “has many other powers over tribal gaming
that it does not possess (absent consent) in Indian territory,” including its
criminal law, the ability to sue individual tribal officials, and discretion to
deny licenses.100 More importantly, the Court advised, “if a State really
wants to sue a tribe for gaming outside Indian lands, the State need only
bargain for a waiver of immunity.”101 “States have more than enough
leverage to obtain such terms because a tribe cannot conduct class III
gaming on its lands without a compact . . . and cannot sue to enforce a
State’s duty to negotiate a compact in good faith . . . .”102
2.

The Validity of Kiowa

The Court next addressed Michigan’s argument against the validity of
Kiowa. Michigan argued that Kiowa overextended tribal sovereign
immunity because when tribes engage in gaming activities beyond their
borders they “operate in [such] capacity less as governments than as private
businesses.”103 However, the Court did not reach the merits of this
argument because it refused to overrule Kiowa for two reasons. First,
nowhere in Michigan’s case as a whole did the Court find any “special
justification” that could overcome its preferred course of honoring stare
decises.104 Michigan only brought forth “retreads of assertions we have
rejected before [in Kiowa].”105 Second, the Court interpreted Congress’s
silence in the aftermath of Kiowa as being a virtual affirmation of its
holding in that case.106 It reasoned that “rather than confronting, as we did
in Kiowa, a legislative vacuum as to the precise issue presented, we act
today against the backdrop of a congressional choice: to retain tribal
immunity (at least for now) in a case like this one.”107 All of this reasoning
98. Id. (“Truth be told, such anomalies often arise from statutes, if for no other reason than
that Congress typically legislates by parts—addressing one thing without examining all others that
might merit comparable treatment.”).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2034-35.
101. Id. at 2035.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2036.
104. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
105. Id. at 2037.
106. Id. at 2038 (“Congress has now reflected on Kiowa and made an initial (though of
course not irrevocable) decision to retain that form of tribal immunity.”) (explanatory
parenthetical appearing in original).
107. Id. at 2038-39 (explanatory parenthetical appearing in original).
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rested on the Court’s assertion that “it is fundamentally Congress’s job, not
ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity. The special
brand of sovereignty the tribes retain—both its nature and its extent—rests
in the hands of Congress.”108 Thus, finding no grounds to overrule Kiowa,
the Court affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit.109
B. JUSTICE THOMAS’S DISSENT
Justices Scalia,110 Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, and Ginsburg111
wrote separately, dissenting from the majority’s opinion. Justice Thomas,
who authored the principle dissent, took a notably different view on tribal
sovereignty than the majority. The dissent states that “[d]espite the Indian
tribes’ subjection to the authority and protection of the United States
Government, this Court has deemed them ‘domestic dependent nations’ that
retain limited attributes of their historic sovereignty.”112 However, “this
notion cannot support a tribe’s claim of immunity in the courts of another
sovereign—either a State (as in Kiowa) or the United States (as here).”113
In the dissent’s view, the immunity of a Tribe from suit, as an incident of
their sovereignty, does not arise as a matter of right, but rather as a matter
of comity.114 “In short, to the extent an Indian tribe may claim immunity in
federal or state court, it is because federal or state law provides it, not

108. Id. at 2037.
109. Id. at 2039.
110. Justice Scalia adopted the reasoning of Justice Thomas’ dissent and wrote only to
address his seemingly contradictory role in deciding Kiowa eighteen years earlier. Id. at 2045
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote:
In Kiowa . . . this Court expanded the judge-invented doctrine of tribal immunity to
cover off-reservation commercial activities . . . I concurred in that decision. For the
reasons given today in Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion, which I join, I am now
convinced that Kiowa was wrongly decided; that, in the intervening 16 years, its error
has grown more glaringly obvious; and that stare decisis does not recommend its
retention. Rather than insist that Congress clean up a mess that I helped make, I
would overrule Kiowa and reverse the judgment below.
Id.
111. Justice Ginsburg also adopted the reasoning of Justice Thomas, but wrote separately to
comment generally about the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Drawing on Kiowa as well as
Seminole Tribe of Florida, she stated: “[f]or the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion . . . by
Justice Thomas, this Court’s declaration of [a tribal] immunity thus absolute was and remains
exorbitant. But I also believe that the Court has carried beyond the pale the immunity possessed
by States of the United States.” Id. at 2055 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Id. (application of foreign sovereign immunity “is a matter, not of legal right, but of
‘grace and comity.’”) (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 711 (2004) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
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merely because the tribe is sovereign.”115 The majority’s ruling in Bay
Mills “permitting immunity for a tribe’s off-reservation acts represents a
substantial affront to a different set of sovereigns—the States, whose
sovereignty is guaranteed by the Constitution.”116 As such, “granting tribes
immunity with respect to their commercial conduct in state territory [does
not] serve the practical aim of comity: allaying friction between
sovereigns.”117
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s contention that
Congressional silence in the aftermath of Kiowa indicated approval of the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. “As a practical matter, it is
‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure
to act represents affirmative congressional approval of’ one of this Court’s
decisions.”118 In addition, despite the majority not addressing such a
contention, the dissent nonetheless stated that tribal “immunity for offreservation commercial acts [is not] necessary to protect tribal selfgovernance.”119 To support this proposition, the dissent cited a volume of
statistics about the proliferation of tribal gaming revenues.120 To conclude,
the dissent stated that the Kiowa decision was “mistaken then, and the
Court’s decision to reaffirm it in the face of the unfairness and conflict it
has engendered is doubly so.”121
C. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S CONCURRENCE
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the opinion of the majority, but
wrote separately to address certain disagreements she had with the principle
dissent of Justice Thomas.122 Specifically, she disagreed with Justice
Thomas’s proposition that tribal sovereign immunity ought to be limited to
the immunity afforded to foreign nations.123 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor
115. Id. at 2047.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2048.
118. Id. at 2052 (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616. 672
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
119. Id. at 2048.
120. Id. at 2050 (“Combined tribal gaming revenues in 28 States have more than tripled—
from $8.5 billion in 1998 to $27.9 billion in 2012.”) (internal citation omitted).
121. Id. at 2055.
122. Id. at 2040 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2042 (“As the principal dissent observes, “comity is about one sovereign
respecting the dignity of another.” Post, at 2047. This Court would hardly foster respect for the
dignity of Tribes by allowing States to sue Tribes for commercial activity on State lands, while
prohibiting Tribes from suing States for commercial activity on Indian lands. Both States and
Tribes are domestic governments who come to this Court with sovereignty that they have not
entirely ceded to the Federal Government.”) (quotations and citations contained in original).

206

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:191

took issue with the dissent’s characterization of the economic situation in
Indian country since the proliferation of Indian gaming. She cited another
volume of statistics illustrating the poverty that is still rampant in Indian
country124 before concluding that “even reservations that have gaming
continue to experience significant poverty, especially relative to the national
average . . . . The same is true of Indian reservations more generally.”125
IV. IMPACT
In February of 2014, the Turtle Mountain Tribe of North Dakota
proposed to open a Class III casino in the city of Grand Forks.126 It had
previously attempted to negotiate with the Grand Forks City Council twice
to open such a casino in 2004 and 2009, to no avail.127 While it appeared
that an initial agreement to negotiate had been reached, little progress had
been made by June.128 Following this impasse, the Turtle Mountain Tribe
began developing an alternative plan to open a casino in Trenton, deep in
the Bakken oil play.129 This scenario reflects a growing, nation-wide trend
of tribes seeking to open casinos beyond the borders of Indian country. In
California, for example, the efforts of the North Fork Rancheria of Mono
Indians to open an off-reservation casino has led to Proposition 48, a
state-wide referendum on the subject of Indian gaming.130 Thus, the Bay
Mills decision has arrived at a crucial period in the development of Indian
gaming.
A. THE AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES FOR STATES
Both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit131 stated in their
respective opinions that even after foreclosing the possibility of federal
lawsuits as an injunctive remedy, there are still several remedies available
124. See id. at 2042-45.
125. Id. at 2045.
126. Charly Haley, Turtle Mountain officials will present casino proposal in GF and on
their reservation, PRAIRIE BUSINESS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.prairiebizmag.com/
event/article/id/17884/#sthash.RYmUC2eh.dpuf.
127. Id.
128. Charly Haley, GF casino plans on hold; tribe pursuing casino in ND oil patch, PRAIRIE
BUSINESS
(June
4,
2014),
http://www.prairiebizmag.com/event/article/id/
19402/#sthash.2SjkXFhF.dpuf.
129. Id.
130. David Olson, PROP. 48: Casino measure could have wide-ranging effects, THE PRESS
ENTERPRISE (Oct. 12, 2014,), http://www.pe.com/articles/casino-751848-tribes-tribe html.
131. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 416 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Our decision
today is not to the exclusion of other remedies that might (or might not) be available to the
plaintiffs.”).
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to States for preventing illegal gambling inside and outside of Indian
country. In addition to any applicable State criminal law, several federal
criminal statutes that have not been preempted by IGRA can be utilized for
such purposes. For example, 18 U.S.C. section 1955 is the federal statute
that prohibits illegal gambling operations, wherever they occur.132
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. section 1166 applies state gambling laws in Indian
lands in the absence of any preemptory federal law (including IGRA), but
vests prosecutorial jurisdiction in the federal government.133 In United
States v. E.C. Investments, Inc.,134 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that either sections 1166 or 1955 could be used to prosecute illegal Class III
gambling on an Indian reservation.135
As part of the compacting process, States can negotiate with Tribes not
only for waivers of immunity, but also to shift jurisdiction for any civil
disputes that arise on Indian lands to state courts.136 In Doe v. Santa Clara
Pueblo,137 the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that “[n]othing in the
language of IGRA prohibits jurisdiction shifting” so as to give effect to a
Tribal-State compact that vested jurisdiction over personal injury claims
arising at a Class III gaming facility in state court.138 Furthermore, if tribes
do wish to open Class III facilities off-reservation like Bay Mills sought to,
the tribe must meet additional burdens.139 For example, the state governor
has veto power over any determination of the NGIC that a Class III facility
can be opened off-reservation.140 In Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2014) (“Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a), (d) (2014) (“[F]or purposes of Federal law, all State laws
pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to
criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the
same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State . . . The United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made
applicable under this section to Indian country . . . .”).
134. 77 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 1996).
135. Id. at 331 (“There is no indication that Congress intended to bar the federal government
from prosecuting violations of section 1955 on Indian territory. In fact, by opening with “for
purposes of Federal law,” section 1166’s jurisdictional grant is not merely limited to section 1166,
but rather applies equally to other federal statutes which could certainly include section 1955.”).
136. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(ii) (2014) (“Any Tribal-State compact . . . may include
provisions relating to . . . the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the
Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations . . . .”).
137. 154 P.3d 644 (N.M. 2007).
138. Id. at 648.
139. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (2014).
140. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2014) “([T]he Secretary [of the Interior] . . . determines
that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian
tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the

208

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:191

Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. United States,141 a federal court
held that the gubernatorial veto power was constitutional,142 thus placing
more regulatory power in the hands of the states. In summary, state
remedies for preventing illegal tribal gaming are readily available, even
after Bay Mills.
B. THE FUTURE OF INDIAN GAMING
The immediate effect of the Bay Mills decision was to cut off litigation
similar to that at issue in the case. Michigan had previously petitioned for
certiorari to review another Sixth Circuit opinion, Michigan v. Sault St.
Marie Band of Chippewa Indians.143 That case involved almost identical
circumstances to those present in Bay Mills, with another tribe in Michigan
seeking to open a Class III gaming facility off its reservation.144 As a result
of Bay Mills, Michigan quite logically withdrew its petition on June 3,
2014.145 However, it remains to be seen what sort of long-term effect Bay
Mills will gave on Indian gaming.
An amici curiae brief filed on behalf of several Indian tribes as part of
the Bay Mills proceedings listed a number of existing Class III gaming
compacts that include waivers of tribal immunity.146 Ironically, one of the
included compacts was between the Seminole Tribe and the State of
Florida.147 After two decades of lawsuits between the two, they compacted
under IGRA and gave mutual waivers of immunity.148 This would appear
to be the simplest solution to assuage any fears about loss of remedy in any
Tribal-State gaming compact negotiation, and Bay Mills does nothing to
change this. In fact, the decision underscores the importance of mutuality
during the compacting process. However, some states may nonetheless
interpret Bay Mills as a loss of remedy, and such states will probably
Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s
determination.).
141. 259 F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.D. Wis. 2003) aff’d, 367 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004).
142. Id. at 799 (“The gubernatorial concurrence does not offend the Tenth Amendment or
principles of federalism.”).
143. 737 F.3d 1075 (6th Cir. 2013).
144. Id. at 1076.
145. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Michigan Withdraws Cert Petition in Michigan
v. Sault Tribe, TURTLE TALK (Sept. 20, 2014), https://turtletalk files.wordpress.com/2014/06/
ltr-clerk-withdraw-13-1372.pdf.
146. Brief of Amici Curiae Seminole Tribe of Florida, et al. 12-23, Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014) (Docket No. 12-515).
147. Id. at 13-15.
148. Id.
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become wary to negotiate with tribes. Thus, despite it being a positive
decision for tribal sovereignty, Bay Mills may yet entail negative results for
those tribes seeking to engage in Class III gaming. Only time will tell.
V. CONCLUSION
The legacy of the Bay Mills decision will rest in its clarification and
refinement of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. That said, the
decision will likely do little to change the status quo in the world of Indian
gaming. In fact, it may result in states seeking greater leverage from Tribes
when negotiating gaming compacts. As the Court makes clear in Bay Mills,
nothing in IGRA prohibits a state from seeking a waiver of immunity from
a tribe or from utilizing any other state or federal remedies for preventing
illegal gambling. The desirable result of Bay Mills would be a greater
degree of communication between tribes and states during the compacting
process about dispute resolution. However, after Seminole Tribe, states still
retain the lion’s share of bargaining power in compact negotiations. While
tribes may be willing to waive sovereign immunity from suit, states may not
be willing to reciprocate. Bay Mills’ legacy will thus ultimately depend on
whether it facilitates, or terminates, amicable negotiation.
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